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adequately equipped to discharge it. But even one who is
ex officio compelled to deny himself freedom of speech may
say wholeheartedly that the great art of judicial biography
requires deep understanding of the judicial process, delicate
analysis of character, and the creative humility of the artist.
My best wishes for the success of your round-table discussion. May it stimulate great biographies.
Very sincerely yours,
Felix Frankfurter
Professor Charles Fairman
Palmer House
Chicago, Illinois

TYPES OF JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY

Arnaud B. Leavellet
It has been a matter of mingled regret and anticipation
that American judicial biography has remained a relatively
undeveloped field of scholarship. The reasons for this neglect are obvious. It is traceable partly to the difficulties
presented by the materials, partly to the unspectacular nature of the careers of judges, who with some notable exceptions have been less subject to the drama of fate than most
public figures, and, incidentally, to the economics of the
book business. Commercial publishers proceed quite frankly
on the regressive assumption that the only biographies worth
printing are those about persons who have already been
written up, and the more often the better. After all, who
buys a biography except on someone whose name is familiar?
Happily, our burgeoning university presses are able to operate on another theory. The gaps in the biographical history of the Supreme Court are rapidly being filled. And
we may expect that as an increasing number of Ph.D.
candidates assault a constantly diminishing number of thesis
topics, the careers of the more important state and lower
federal court judges will eventually be given proper consideration.
Judicial biography cannot and should not escape judgt A.B. 1937, M.A. 1939, Ph.D. 1940, University of California, Los
Angeles. Associate Professor of Political Science, Stanford University.
Author of JUSTICE JAMES WILSON (in preparation).
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ment by comparison with other forms of the biographer's
art. At the same time the legal materials produce special
responsibilities and provide certain opportunities for analysis
and criticism which must be evaluated by more narrowly
professional criteria. I propose to present a few comments
on the relation of judicial bigoraphy to other varieties, and
some general observations on the several types of approach
within the field itself. Biographical writing in general, since
the beginning of the present century, has been overwhelmingly influenced by the techniques and assumptions embodied
in the work of the late Lytton Strachey. In his sketches of
eminent Victorians, Strachey broke sharply with an older
tradition of biography that was full of fatuous eulogy and
badly digested history. He demonstrated successfully that
it is not necessary to be tedious and dry in order to be
scholarly or authoritative. His special talents were a lucid
and urbane style, a brevity which excluded everything that
was redundant but nothing that was significant, and a realism that produced insight through a nice combination of
factual accuracy and iconoclasm. Above all, he insisted
that personality, rather than achievement, must be the primary concern of biography, and he was a master in selecting
the particular episodes or aspects of his subjects' lives which
most vividly revealed character.
The influence of these procedures is clearly evident in
the work of such popular biographers as Carl Van Doren,
Marquis James, and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. But their influence has been resisted in judicial biography, and for understandable reasons. In the case of a judge, personality
and professional accomplishments have an intimate reciprocal relationship. Biographies of judges which do not deal
with technical legal achievements, as is the case with a
recent and rhapsodic best seller on Justice Holmes, are a
little worse than incomplete. Further, when an emphasis
on personality is joined to psychological interpretations of
judicial opinions-. la the realist school of jurisprudencethe combination may turn out to be what Mr. Ben W. Palmer,
in the introduction to his study of Marshall and Taney, has
called the "biological, visceral, glandular, Freudian and episodic" kind of biography. In short, there is always the possibility that the search for the private character of the man
will lead to an illegitimate and inaccurate subjectivism.
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Douglas Freeman, currently at work on a biography of Washington, put the problem recently into these cautious words:
"I think I know now where Washington was every day of
his life, but I would not presume to say what was going on
in his mind." Yet an insight into inner character and motivations must be provided if judicial biography is to be
worthy of the name. The judicial biographer must accomplish the special and difficult task of balancing sharp character delineation and the impersonal legal materials.
The type of judicial biography closest to the standards
of biographical writing in general, and incidentally the most
profitable financially, if that crude criterion may be mentioned, is that which fills the canvas to the frame with a
picture of the judge as a person, subordinating the historical
background, but showing the significance and impact of the
subject on the contemporary scene. This approach seeks to
realize the purpose of all art-the explication of certain
values or forces, or a whole historical epoch, through one
example or participant. It is a type of biography which
demands the highest literary skill, and which requires the
kind of extensive, intimate, and preferably first hand, information about the subject's life and habits which is usually
difficult, if not impossible, to obtain. Aside from the problem of materials, there are actually only a few of our judges
who should properly be treated with this method. Most are
either not sufficiently striking as personalities, or sufficiently
significant as representatives of trends and ideas. Two recent biographies, however, one on Brandeis and one on
Holmes, are brilliant examples of the successful use of this
approach.1
A different technique is adopted by another group of
judicial biographers and has produced the majority of works
now available. This type includes more historical background, and ranges more systematically into the issues and
politics of the period involved. It shows the impact of milieu
on the Justice, as well as vice versa. It requires genuine
historical sense and substance, plus discrimination and careful organization. It is particularly valuable as a method for
illuminating not only the career of one man, but also the
institutional workings of the judicial branch as it thinks
1. MAsON, BRANDEIS:
JusTIcE HOLIES (1942).
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about and acts upon the practical problems of law and state2
craft.
Additional types of judicial biography are distinguished
from the first two mentioned by reason of special emphasis
upon certain elements or ramifications of the jurist's art.
Critical analysis of the evolution of constitutional principles
is an obvious device, well illustrated by a recent biography
of Chief Justice Stone.3 The equally obvious weakness of
an exclusively legal treatment is the fact that it makes the
work both more and less than a biography. It may very
easily lead to over-stressing the importance of a particular
judge in the growth of the law, unless a comparative technique is adopted. It is, therefore, a method perhaps better
suited to the monograph or periodical.
The examination of judicial lives from the point of view
of economic forces and ideas has, with some exceptions, been
undertaken largely by special pleaders. They have written
primarily as historians, rather than biographers. Jeffersonians, with much solid fact and good sense, have corrected
many of the hypocrisies and platitudes of the old Federalist
historians who accepted without question the identification4
of certain economic concepts with constitutional principles.
Researchers of Socialist persuasion, such as Gustavus Myers,
have pulled from official sources many significant facts
about the economic affairs of certain judges. 5 A great deal
of very important interpretative work remains to be done on
this level. But it remains to be done with a broader grasp
of economic theory and history, and a more realistic view of
the origins of the economic convictions of judges and the
way they are transmuted into law. It is hardly tenable any
longer to hold that personal interest is a direct influence in
this matter. But vital economic forces are clearly at work
2. See especially
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through our judges. The Roosevelt Court should provide
significant opportunities for the economic approach.
A fifth and a relatively unexploited area of interpretation is the relation between the thinking of particular judges
and systematic philosophy or political theory.6 Vogues in
philosophical schools come and go, but while they hold sway
as part of .the intellectual tradition, they may and do influence the way in which judicial problems are posed, if not
always the way in which they are solved. To mention just
one example, the so-called Scottish "Common Sense" philosophy, now dead as a dodo, was, during the late 18th and early
19th centuries, widely popular among American lawyers and
judges, providing a set of basic psychological and metaphysical concepts which proved most useful as an aid to formulating and rationalizing legal and constitutional principles.
As a final, and admittedly very gross, method of classifying the types of judicial biography, it might be observed that
some biographers write from within and some from without
the scheme of values that has governed the life and work of
their subjects. Either position, in the extreme, reduces the
power and value of the interpretation. An uncritical acceptance of the judge's assumptions and beliefs, plus a compulsion to apologize for what might be errors or deficiencies,
is neither instructive nor convincing. Justice Holmes in
particular has been subjected to the adoration treatment.
Some of his biographers have been driven to desperate lengths
to express their awe and respect. One sums it up in these
words: "Justice Holmes attained a wisdom that was wider
than the market place, deeper than any oil well."7 Without
belaboring the point it seems clear that Holmes' knowledge
of the law was not infallible and that his personal philosophy
would be regarded by some as not ethically adequate. On
the other hand, hostility to the subject's views may easily
lead to superficiality, inaccuracy, and unfairness. But, of
course, few biographers choose subjects that do not arouse
their interest and sympathy. On the whole, in view of the
power of judicial symbolism in the American tradition, the
primary need would seem to be for objectivity and candor,
and perhaps even a little of Strachey's iconoclasm. 8
6. See SMITH, ROGER B. TANEY: JACKSONIAN JURIST (1936).
7. BENT, JUSTICE OLIVER'WENDELL HOLMES 4 (1932).
8. Although a commentator may be fully aware of the necessity of

objectivity and fairness, it is sometimes possible to misconstrue even
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The classification of the various types of judicial biography given above is necessarily arlcitrary. Many biographies may be placed in more than one category, and the
truly great biography by no means must encompass all of
these approaches. The judicial biographer has succeeded if
what Carlyle said of Boswell can be said of him. "Boswell,"
he wrote, "in spite of his sneaking sycophancies, wrote a good
Book because he had a heart and an eye to discern Wisdom,
and an utterance to render it forth."

INGREDIENTS OF JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY

John P. Frcankt
A completed judicial biography represents a series of
problems solved; and some of those problems will be considered here. But before a biography can be analyzed in
terms of its subsidiary difficulties, there must be identification of the basic purposes and goals in describing the life of
a judge.
The biographer's object can be stated only generally,
but the generalization need not be devoid of meaning. Biography seeks to recount the events of a life with fidelity, but
it needs to be much more than a series of photographs, no
matter how detailed, of the stones over which the hero
strode. A biography portrays a life, but it must do so in
the written words of judges because the circumstances, or the total

philosophical fix, are not adequately taken into account. A rather
interesting example of such misconstruction is involved in the frequent
quotation of the late Chief Justice Hughes' statement: "We live under
the Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it is .... "
[Speech before the Elmira Chamber of Connerce, May 3, 1907, in
Addresses, 139 (1908).
Quoted in MASON, BRANDEIS: LAWYER AND
JUDGE IN THE MODERN STATE 1 (1933); CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE
SUPREME CouRT 1 (1934); HAINES, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT
IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS, 1789-1835 title page (1944).]
The writer has in his possession a letter dictated by Chief Justice
Hughes, dated February 2, 1948, in which it is stated that this quotation has been wrongly interpreted and given an implication Hughes
regarded as unfair to the Supreme Court of the United States. In
short, the legitimate interpretation is not that the Constitution is
whatever the judges say it is, but rather that the Constitution is what
the judges say it is.
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